Consciousness in animals is a difficult matter. We could in fact wonder if there is a way to know whether animals are conscious or not. One reason for this is the difficulty of explaining or defining consciousness in a proper and rigorous way. We can assume that consciousness is the result of the physical world and thus describing it is a process correlating with complex behavior. This is a strong assumption but it permits us to accord consciousness to other humans because they behave as we do (i.e. in complex manners). Another stance, void of assumption, is to define consciousness as the phenomenon that makes us feel the world and to not try to explain it by physical properties, because it is first of all a subjective phenomenon that cannot be shared nor proven to exist. Depending on the stance taken, the question regarding the existence of consciousness in other animals than humans takes a different face. This paper aims to discern what the problems in both views are and see weather animals could be granted consciousness.
The first definition (often used in scientific studies of animals, as it is the only rigorous way to test consciousness) assumes that complex behaviors correlate with the existence of consciousness, therefore complexity have to be more precisely defined. One way would be to grant complexity to behaviors that are not explainable by a simple rule of thumb (stance that is taken by Dawkins for example). From this consensus we can classify animals in two classes: non-complex and complex. Insects for example, when studied alone show no more complex behavior than a simple rule of thumb (The example of the wasp of Fabre). Thus they would be considered as unconscious as opposed to birds who are able to display complex behavior such as recognizing sequence of events (shown in Dawkins’ book) and could be therefore considered as conscious. In a similar fashion, apes occasionally show complex communication (such as Kanzi or Sherman and Austin) and could also be identified as a conscious being.
But this definition has some problems. First, it doesn’t match the conception that we have of consciousness. Indeed a simple computer program is easily able to simulate the behavior of “sequence recognition” and to some extent the modes of communication, even though we would not grant machines the status of conscious beings. Moreover, until we get a rigorous definition of an organism or individual, this definition would lead to credit consciousness to societies of organisms as their behaviors are not easily explainable (harder than individual humans for human societies). Furthermore, complexity is more of a gradual scale than an arbitrary division. There is indeed no sharp boundary dividing non-complexity and complexity; it varies gradually. Would consciousness be spread in the same way? It is possible, and this would lead us to attribute consciousness gradually to animals in accordance to the complexity of their behavior. In this case for example, cells would have an almost nonexistent consciousness while bees and computers a little bit more so and apes would have a consciousness similar to our own. But would consciousness lose its meaning in this way? Is it not something particular? If we accord it to everyone, but in different level, what would be the uniqueness of having it? It seems that we would lose what we were looking for.
But there is another way to describe complexity in a less gradual way which would match our conception. The existence of language could be a clue for the existence of consciousness. Animals having language would be considered conscious while those lacking language would be considered without consciousness. This could be a way to define consciousness in a less arbitrary way (as language seems indeed to require some complex thought). From this view, organisms such as cells would not be considered conscious as they do not have complex communication skills. Similarly, bees when studied carefully do not have a complex language but a simple rule-based system that carry meaning when seen globally. On the other hand, some apes have shown signs of complex communications which share similar properties to human language. In this case, consciousness would be granted, maybe in a lesser extent to apes but not to bees or cells. But we should not forget that some computer models have also been able to generate language (vocabulary in the case of the talking heads project or syntax in some computational models) through the interaction among simple agents. It is true that it does not match human capacity, but humans no longer have an exclusive claim to syntax or words. In fact, language could finally be no more than a behavior resulting from a little more complex process than any other animal communication. But because of the intentionality that seemed to be required in some case (as Dawkins noticed with Sherman and Austin), the idea that language is linked with consciousness is probably right. For this reason language in animals should be studied in greater detail but not by trying to make animals learn human language which is for them not natural.
As it has been shown by several philosophers such as Nagel, Chalmers and Jackson, consciousness can’t be reduced to physical properties. Therefore, we should look somewhere else than complexity in the physical realm or behavior to grant consciousness to an entity. Furthermore, a more careful study of our own consciousness contradicts the thesis that when there is complex behavior there is consciousness. Indeed, it happens often that we act in a complex manner without being conscious (while playing a musical instrument for example). Similarly, there are some occasions when we are in someway more conscious while not doing any complex action, as for example when in state of contemplation. Also, when using language, it is not necessary to consciously manipulate the words and syntax properties. Consciousness, in this view is a passive phenomenon that does not have any role in the behavior.
With this definition in mind, the question regarding consciousness in animals is in fact the same than the one regarding humans. We have no way of knowing if consciousness is present in others because the behavior does not always reflect consciousness and we have no way to know what others are feeling. This is the problem of other minds that has no any answer yet. We are here with no method for testing consciousness in other entities. Granting consciousness to only humans would be anthropocentric while granting to every living being would require a definition of life.
Now however, let’s look again at our own experiences to see if there’s any other way of granting consciousness to others. When we interact with others, it is not our reasoning about their behavior that makes us think that they are conscious. It would require too much thinking. It is only because we feel a presence in them. This is in the domain of the emotion that we seem to be able to detect consciousness in others. It might be a mistake after all, but since we have no way to decide properly if an entity is conscious or not, this is a good way to decide whether animals are conscious or not. In fact, for every person that has had the luck of having a special relationship with animals, at least mammals like dogs or cats in their house, they have probably felt a presence in them. This empathic emotion might not be reliable, but in our daily life it seems to work and because of that, we have good reason to believe that in general it is right. It would be interesting to clarify this aspect and see what makes us empathic to animals and on occasion to computers (quite rarely in fact and mostly temporary) but not to rocks.
The existence of consciousness in animals (as well as in other humans than ourselves) depends on the definition or view taken regarding consciousness. Complexity in behavior seems at first a good indicator of consciousness but because of arbitrary decisions over what is complex or not and the gradual complexity found in nature, we have to forget this indicator. Language on the other hand appears to be a better indicator, as it seems to require intentionality. But finally our experience tells us that consciousness is not related with complex behavior, as we are often unconscious while doing certain complex actions while at other moments we are fully aware of ourselves when we are simply sitting and reflecting. The question regarding consciousness in animals appears to be just like the question of other minds. In our daily life we attribute consciousness to others not because of their complex behavior but because of an empathic feeling. It would be interesting to deepen our understanding of this feeling and see if it has something to tell us about the consciousness of others, including animals.