What is reality? Does it exist? These two questions have been asked since ancient times. Some of the answers have been accepted as dogma and permitted to some extent, the birth of science. But as science evolved, the answers evolved as well and the questions remain even more difficult. With the birth of quantum physics and its numerous interpretations, we are left with a strange reality. Although these questions are difficult, it is possible to agree on the reality of the world and to see that a common concept, that of information is shared between the apparent dualism of consciousness and matter. This paper argues for a neutral monism where information is taken as the fundamental basis of reality.

We cannot accept solipsism as a description of our world, because we need to accept the existence of other minds. Similarly, we need to accept the existence of an independent and objective reality permitting minds to share a common place from which they get their compatible experiences. Realism is necessary to discuss our common view of the experienced world.

Reality has often been seen as dual; even our language show this duality by the distinction between subject and object. But if we want to find a correct explanation for our world, we should not divide it in two parts. Spinoza thought this as well1. By dividing, we would then need to find a link between the two parts. Ultimately, we want a theory which embraces the whole world; the apparent division should be then a consequence. Only a kind of monism can be a candidate for this embracing theory.

Of course, this theory won’t be physicalism with its reductive approach. As it has been shown by Chalmers2, Jackson3, Nagel4 and others, consciousness can not be explained by physical facts. Consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical as water properties seem to do for example. We need another basis for reality than physical facts.

Furthermore we cannot accept a mental monism where subjective experiences alone would be the basis of reality. The subjective aspect of the mind is in conflict with an objective reality. Indeed, as said earlier, we need to agree on a common and independent reality in order for us to discuss our subjective points of view. It follows that neither mental experiences, neither physical properties could be the basis of the reality. We need a neutral basis which is neither mental, neither physical. Some authors such as Sayre5, Mach6 and sometimes Russell7 also see this need for a neutral monism.

One of the common concepts we found both in our subjective experiences and in our scientific theories is the idea of information. It could be even argued that physical theories are only models which interpret the available information. Floridi8 and Sayre9, for instance, share this point of view. Length, mass or other primary properties found in the scientific theories would be just interpretation of measured differences. Length, for example, is just a difference between two points in the abstract concept of space. An interesting definition of information from Bateson10 makes this point clear: information is “difference which makes a difference”. These differences are measurable because they make a difference, in other words, they contain information that we interpret as specific properties. Similarly, these same differences would be interpreted as material objects such as table, mother, cats… according to our model of reality learned along our history which is the basis of our common sense. It is worth to note that our language surely occupies an important role in this process of interpretation.

The sensations or qualitative states of mind would be the other aspect of information, the one from which we gain knowledge of the precedent. Seen through our inner subjective view, this phenomenal aspect of experience could be seen as a direct acknowledgment of information before and so without any interpretation. James would describe this direct acknowledgment as “pure experience” (neither subject, neither object)11. This view should not be identified with a mental monism. Here “pure experience” is a state before the actual realization and interpretation of our experience in our mind (before we realize that we are having a red sensation for example). This “pure experience” is itself the complete information, the reality that we only access partially through our interpretation.

Information would thus be the underlying reality of what science is discovering and what our consciousness is aware. This view has many advantages over other ones. It is non dual and does not put more importance on any side of the apparent dualism. It avoids the mind-body problem and makes reality simpler as it contains only information. Primary properties are described as interpretations of available information according to a specific theoretical model, while our common view of reality is the result of interpretations according to another model, the one learned along our history: our common sense. Sensation, on the other hand is the direct acknowledgement of information. We have here a picture of reality where information is central to the phenomenal aspect as well as to the objective reality that science is probing.

 

 

1 Spinoza, 1677, The Ethics (H.M. Elwes, Trans., 1955). Dover Publisher, New York.

 

2 Chalmers, D. J., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press

 

3 Jackson, F., 1986, What Mary Didn’t Know, Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-295

 

4 Nagel, Th., 1974, What is it like to be a bat?, Philosophical Review 83: 435-50.

 

5 Sayre, K., 1996, Cybernetics, in Shanker, S., 1996

 

6 Mach, E., 1886, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen. Fifth edition translated as The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of Physical to the Psychical, New York: Dover. 1959

 

7 Russell, B., 1921, The Analysis of Mind. Reprinted: London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978.

 

8 Floridi L., 2004, Informational realism, Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology vol. 3 (2004), pp 7-12

 

9 Sayre, K., 1996, Cybernetics, in Shanker, S., 1996

 

10 Bateson, G., 1972, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, San Francisco: Chandler

 

11 “The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the ‘pure’ experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actually, or existence, a simple that.” p. 23

James, W., 1904, Does Consciousness Exist?, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1(20,21). Reprinted in James, W., 1912, 39-91.